In Ethekweni Municipality v Nadesan and Others [2021] 6 BLLR 598 (LC) the Labour Court (LC) had to determine whether an Indian male employee was unfairly discriminated against when he was not appointed to the position of Senior Storekeeper, Fire and Emergency Services. This position had been vacant for a year and the filling of this position had become urgent as it was impacting on the functionality of the department. It was a critical and highly specialised role that required a lot of experience to develop in-depth knowledge of specialised firefighting equipment and uniforms. There were accordingly very few candidates with that experience. The employee had 15 years of experience and he scored the best among other shortlisted candidates in the written examination and interview questions. There was, however, over-representation of Indian males in the Emergency Services Cluster whereas there was under-representation of white males, white females, and African females. The selection panel was, therefore, aware that ideally an African female should be appointed to the position to address this inequity. There were, however, no suitable African female candidates so the selection panel recommended the appointment of the employee on the basis that African females could be appointed to other vacancies within the cluster to address the inequity. The recommendation from the selection panel was rejected and the position was re-advertised with the hope that a suitable African female candidate would come forward in the next round.
The employee alleged that this constituted unfair discrimination based on race and referred a dispute to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). The employer municipality alleged that the employee was not appointed because Indian male employees were already overrepresented in the occupational level in which the position fell. The CCMA found that the employee had been unfairly discriminated against. The municipality then referred the dispute to the LC alleging that the commissioner erred in finding that the employee was unfairly discriminated against as there had been no attack on the employment equity plan.
The LC was required to consider whether the affirmative action measure not to appoint the employee was fair and rational in the circumstances. The LC referred to the decision in Solidarity and Others v Department of Correctional Services and Others (Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union and Another as amici curiae) [2016] 10 BLLR 959 (CC) to determine which test to apply to determine the lawfulness of an affirmative action measure. In this case, there were two views regarding the rationality of an affirmative action measure. The one view is that a measure should not be interfered with if it is rationally connected to addressing identified demographic imbalances. The second view is that rationality is not the only ground, and the court is required to consider the effect of the employment equity plan. Therefore, it may still constitute unfair discrimination even if the measure may rationally advance demographic representivity in general, but it infringes on the dignity, right to equality and other legitimate interests of the non-appointed candidate. Whitcher J preferred the latter test in this case.
The LC per Whitcher J found that the ‘fairness’ approach requires one to first consider whether the affirmative action measure is rational and then one needs to consider whether it is fair by considering the facts of the matter. A test was suggested in terms of which a measure would be regarded as irrational if the following factors are present –
If, after considering these factors, it is determined that the measure is rational then it needs to be determined on the facts of the case whether the benefit for the advantaged person outweighs the harm to the external parties. Therefore, although a measure that is rational is presumed to be fair it may still be regarded as unfair depending on the facts. Factors to consider assessing fairness are –
It was emphasised that a candidate’s disappointment cannot lightly trump the need to achieve transformation in the workplace. Therefore, the facts of the case always need to be considered. For example, an employer may be able to demonstrate that it was fair in the circumstances to negatively impact an employee’s dignity because there is an operational requirement to attain certain demographics for Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment purposes in order to preserve business.
In this case, the abovementioned factors were considered, and it was found that the decision not to appoint the employee was irrational in the circumstances notwithstanding that there was no evidence led on the critical nature of the role or the impairment to the employee’s dignity. It was, however, irrational to re-advertise a role when there had been no suitable African female candidates available and there had been no consideration given to appointing African females into other roles in the cluster to address the inequities in that cluster. It also appeared that incorrect statistics were used as a basis for the decision.
In regard to the allegation by the employer municipality that the employee was required to attack the municipality’s employment equity plan, it was held that that was an incorrect interpretation of the South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard (Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union as amicus curiae) [2014] 11 BLLR 1025 (CC) case as to require an employee to challenge the plan would have the effect of depriving employees of the right to allege unfair discrimination if the decision was taken in accordance with a valid and acceptable employment equity plan.
The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
In Churchill v Premier of Mpumalanga and Another [2021] 6 BLLR 539 (SCA), an employee instituted a delictual claim against the employer for R 7,5 million for medical treatment, general damages and loss of income. The claim arose as a result of the employee suffering physical injuries and post traumatic disorder, which eventually led to her resignation as a result of being assaulted in the workplace by strikers. The employee had been working in the employer’s building during a labour-related protest when a member of a trade union mistakenly thought that she swore at him. She then locked herself in her colleague’s office. The strikers broke down the door and carried her down the stairs, threw her shoes at her and racially abused her. She sued the Premier of Mpumalanga on the basis that reasonable steps had not been taken to protect her.
The employer alleged that the High Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the matter as s 35(1) of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (COIDA) precludes an employee from claiming from the employer for an occupational injury. Furthermore, negligence was denied.
The court held that to constitute an occupational injury there must be a causal connection between the accident and the person’s employment and, therefore, the facts of each matter need to be determined. In this case the employee suffered her injuries during the course of her employment as she was at her place of work at the time. The court then had to consider whether the injuries arose out of her employment. It is more likely for the injury to have arisen out of employment if there is a close link between the injury and the performance of the employee’s ordinary duties. After considering the facts it was held that the injury was not sufficiently closely connected to her employment to have arisen from her employment. The incident had not occurred because of her employment or because of the position she held or anything she had done when performing her duties but because she had run into these protesters and one of the protesters mistakenly thought that she had sworn at him. Furthermore, the assault had racial and gender undertones. It was held that attacks on dignity are not part of the job. It was, therefore, held that the injury did not arise out of employment, and she accordingly was not precluded by COIDA from claiming damages from the employer. The matter was remitted to the High Court to determine the damages that she was entitled to.
Monique Jefferson BA (Wits) LLB (Rhodes) is a legal practitioner at DLA Piper in Johannesburg.
This article was first published in De Rebus in 2021 (Aug) DR 40.
