David Matlala BProc (University of the North) LLB (Wits) LLM (UCT) LLM (Harvard) LLD (Fort Hare) HDip Tax Law (Wits) is an adjunct professor of law at the University of Fort Hare.
October 2018 (5) South African Law Reports (pp 323 – 660); September [2018] 3 All South African Law Reports (pp 409 – 743); 2018 (8) Butterworths Constitutional Law Reports – August (pp 881 – 1027); 2018 (9) Butterworths Constitutional Law Reports – September (pp 1029 – 1178); 2018 (11) Butterworths Constitutional Law Reports – November (pp 1309 – 1449)
This column discusses judgments as and when they are published in the South African Law Reports, the All South African Law Reports and the South African Criminal Law Reports. Readers should note that some reported judgments may have been overruled or overturned on appeal or have an appeal pending against them: Readers should not rely on a judgment discussed here without checking on that possibility – Editor.
Abbreviations:
CC: Constitutional Court
ECB: Eastern Cape Local Division, Bisho
ECG: Eastern Cape Division, Grahamstown
GP: Gauteng Division, Pretoria
LAC: Labour Appeal Court
LC: Labour Court
SCA: Supreme Court of Appeal
WCC: Western Cape Division, Cape Town
Advocates
Whether an advocate is a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of advocates: The case of Jiba and Another v General Council of the Bar of South Africa; Mrwebi v General Council of the Bar of South Africa [2018] 3 All SA 622 (SCA) dealt with the removal, from the roll of advocates, of three persons who were employed in the public service, namely the Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions (DNDPP) Nomgcobo Jiba; the Special Director of Public Prosecutions and head of Specialised Commercial Crime Unit, Lawrence Sithembiso Mrwebi; as well as the Director of Public Prosecutions in North Gauteng (Pretoria), Sibongile Mzinyathi. The GP per Legodi and Hughes JJ held that Jiba and Mrwebi were not fit and proper persons to continue to practise as advocates and ordered removal of the names from the roll of advocates. The case against Mzinyathi was dismissed with costs. As a result, Jiba and Mrwebi appealed to the SCA against the High Court order, while the respondent General Council of the Bar (GCB) cross-appealed against the costs order only in the Mzinyathi matter.
The main reason for removal of the names of the three from the roll of advocates, alternatively their suspension from practising as advocates, stemmed from the way in which they handled the case of the head of Crime Intelligence within the South African Police Service, Lieutenant-General Richard Mdluli, who was charged with fraud, corruption and related charges, as well as with murder and attempted murder. Fraud and corruption charges against Mdluli were withdrawn by Jiba and Mrwebi with Mzinyathi also allegedly involved. Murder and attempted murder charges were withdrawn by one Chauke, the Director of Public Prosecutions, South Gauteng (Johannesburg) who was not involved in the present matter. In the case of Jiba the other allegations of note were that she failed to file a record of decision in terms of r 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court in another matter while she also failed to file an answering affidavit by a specified date in the present matter as directed by the Deputy Judge President of the GP.
The majority of the SCA per Shongwe ADP (Seriti and Mocumie JJA concurring) upheld the appeals of both Jiba and Mrwebi with no order as to costs. In the case of Mrwebi the High Court order was changed to suspension from practice as an advocate for a period of six months, backdated to the date of the granting of the High Court order in September 2016. The GCB’s cross-appeal was dismissed with costs.
It was held, as Jiba explained in her answering affidavit, that fraud and corruption charges against Mdluli were withdrawn for purposes of further investigation and that the intention was to reinstate them if further incriminating evidence came to hand, the difference of opinion with the view of counsel, including senior counsel, could not fairly be considered sufficient to conclude that she was not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of advocates. At best one could infer some form of incompetence with regard to her duties, which could be grounds to remove her from being the DNDPP but not sufficient to remove her from the roll of advocates. It followed that the GCB failed to establish any misconduct against her. Therefore, the first jurisdictional requirement in removal cases was lacking.
In the case of Mrwebi it was held that he sought to mislead the court by stating that he took a decision to withdraw the charges against Mdluli ‘in consultation’ with Mzinyathi but that was not the case. What weighed heavily against him were answers and explanations to allegations he faced. He received representations from Mdluli and decided to withdraw the charges and discontinue the prosecution of the latter before discussion or ‘in consultation’ with Mzinyathi as required by the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998. In his case the alleged offending misconduct had been established with the result that he was not a fit and proper person to practise as an advocate. However, the High Court misdirected itself regarding the appropriate sanction to be imposed. He should have been suspended from practising as an advocate, more especially as he did not personally benefit from his misconduct or prejudice any client.
In a minority judgment Van der Merwe JA (Leach JA concurring) held that the appeal of both Jiba and Mrwebi had to be dismissed with costs while the cross-appeal of the GCB had to be upheld with costs. In the South African system of justice, the courts should be able to rely absolutely on the word of practitioners and for that reason there was a serious objection to allowing a practitioner who was untruthful and deceived or attempted to deceive a court, to continue practising. In the case of Jiba, she gave untruthful evidence under oath, which displayed dishonesty and a lack of integrity. In the case of Mrwebi, he lied about consultation with Mzinyathi and abused his senior position in the prosecutorial service to advantage Mdluli and ensure that he should not be prosecuted.
Civil procedure
Employer is not party to emoluments attachment dispute: In African Development Bank v Nseera; In re: Nseera v Nseera [2018] 3 All SA 646 (GP) the respondent Nseera was granted a maintenance order against her husband pending finalisation of divorce proceedings. Alleging the husband’s failure to pay the required maintenance, she approached a magistrate’s court, which granted her an emoluments attachment order that was duly served on his employer, the appellant African Development Bank. In response the appellant approached the magistrate’s court in terms of s 28 of the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 (the Act) for review and setting aside of the attachment order. Although a number of grounds were raised in the review application, the main one was that the appellant, as employer of the respondent’s husband, had not been given notice of the application for the attachment order which, had it been done, would have been opposed. The review application having failed the appellant appealed to the GP. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Kollapen J held that s 28 of the Act not only provided the remedy of rescission, but also provided the details of how that remedy was to be invoked. That pointed in the direction that the section did not render it peremptory to give the employer notice of emoluments attachment in advance. If that were the case or the reasonable interpretation to be afforded to the section it would hardly make sense that the legislature would have devoted so much attention in creating both the remedy and procedure for an aggrieved employer to invoke if the intention was to give notice to the employer before the making of the order.
The employer was not party to the dispute between the original parties who had a direct interest in the maintenance order. The employer was required at best to enforce the order of maintenance and could, therefore, be seen as a party from that limited perspective. Nevertheless, that did not preclude the employer from having a voice with regard to the attachment order made, and in the instant case the employer’s involvement was structured as a post-order intervention in the form of a rescission, suspension or variation application which gave substance to the rights of the employer.
The section supported the granting of an order ex parte, which did not offend the right to be heard as expressly provided for in s 28(2) and, which, would largely be confined to questions around practicability of the order or the legal ground advanced as to why the order was not competent. The rescission application, which was grounded in s 28(2), could not become an avenue through which the employer sought to litigate on behalf of a party who was not before the court. The interest of the employer related to the practicability and enforceability of the emoluments attachment order. It would be undesirable for an employer to purport to enter the principal dispute between the parties as the appellant sought to do.
Constitutional law
Invalidity of regulations prescribing minimum uniform norms and standards for school infrastructure: Section 5A of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 (SASA) provides for the making of regulations by the Minister of Basic Education prescribing minimum uniform norms and standard for school infrastructure. In keeping with the section in Equal Education v Minister of Basic Education [2018] 3 All SA 705 (ECB) the respondent minister made the regulations in question in November 2013 by way of Regulations Relating to Minimum Uniform Norms and Standards for Public School Infrastructure, 2013 (GN R920 GG3708/29-11-2013). However, the regulations were cast in broad terms and did not have time-frames by which the required infrastructure would have been provided. Moreover, reg 4(5)(a) made the implementation of the norms and standard referred to in the regulations subject to the resources and cooperation of other government agencies and entities responsible for infrastructure in general and making available of such infrastructure, such as Treasury, the Department of Public Works and Provincial Departments of Education. The applicant, Equal Education, a non-profit organisation, approached the High Court for an order declaring reg 4(5)(a) and other regulations as being inconsistent with the Constitution and SASA in varying ways. In the case of reg 4(5)(a) in particular the applicant saw it as a means to excuse the minister to escape the obligation to provide adequate school infrastructure in order to fulfil the right to basic education.
Msizi AJ held that reg 4(5)(a) was inconsistent with the Constitution, SASA and earlier order of the same court, which required the minister to consult all relevant stakeholders prior to promulgation of the regulations. The regulation was accordingly declared unlawful and invalid. Many other regulations, as specified in the court order, were also declared unlawful and invalid. The minister was ordered to pay costs.
It was held that unlike other socio-economic rights, such as access to adequate housing, health care services and the like, which contained internal qualifiers stating that the state had to take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources to achieve progressive realisation thereof, the right to basic education was immediately deliverable. Given the nature of the right to basic education, and the crisis involved, there was no reason for the minister not to develop a plan and allocate resources in accordance with her obligation.
The natural consequence flowing from the stance assumed by the minister was that she could not make any commitment regarding the basic norms and standard for infrastructure in public schools. That was unacceptable. The courts had always rejected reliance on budget constraints as a justification for failure to provide essentials.
Unconstitutionality of government policy on the appointment of insolvency practitioners and liquidators: The facts in Minister of Justice and Another v SA Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association and Others 2018 (5) SA 349 (CC); 2018 (9) BCLR 1099 (CC) were that in seeking to bring about transformation in the insolvency practitioners industry and appointment of liquidators, in February 2014, the appellant Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development introduced a policy to be applied. Clause 7 of the policy, dealing with appointment of trustees of insolvent estates, required the Master of the High Court to appoint insolvency practitioners in the ratio A4:B3:C2:D1. Category A represented African, coloured, Indian and Chinese females who became South African citizens before 27 April 1994. Category B represented males belonging to the same group as in Category A. Category C represented white females who became South African citizens before 27 April 1994. Category D included white males and African, coloured, Indian or Chinese persons who became a South African citizen on or after 27 April 1994. The numbers 4:3:2:1 represented the number of insolvency practitioners who had to be appointed from a category before the next category could be considered. Effectively the categorisation meant a white female (Category C) would be appointed only after satisfaction of the first two categories, while a white male would in all probability never be appointed as he competed with everybody else save that appointments were made in alphabetical order and that the profession was made almost entirely of white males.
The applicants, being a number of associations representing the interests of insolvency practitioners, as well as other groups, approached the WCC for an order declaring the policy unconstitutional. The High Court held that the policy was irrational and imposed impermissible quotas and accordingly declared it invalid. An appeal to the SCA failed, the court holding that the policy was irrational because it was arbitrary and capricious. Furthermore, it breached the principle of legality in that it failed to promote the interest of creditors in line with the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.
In a further appeal the CC granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal with costs. Delivering the majority judgment Jafta J held that the facts placed on record by the applicants for leave to appeal did not show that the policy was likely to achieve equality. If action was taken for no reason or no justifiable reason it was arbitrary. In the absence of reasons justifying it, the unequal operation of the policy was arbitrary and led to impermissible differentiation. Failure to prove that the policy was reasonably likely to achieve equality meant that there was no proof of a rational link between the policy and the purpose sought to be achieved. The impugned policy was, therefore, also irrational.
In a minority judgment Madlanga J (Froneman J and Kollapen AJ concurring) held that the policy met the requirements of s 9(2) of the Constitution dealing with taking legislative and other measures to protect or advance persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination (affirmative action) and promoted the achievement of equality. Furthermore, it was neither irrational nor arbitrary.
Unconstitutionality of regulations made in terms of Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992: In the case of Naki and Others v Director General: Department of Home Affairs and Another [2018] 3 All SA 802 (ECG) the first applicant Naki was a South African citizen and a member of the South African National Defence Force. While on a peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo he fell in love with the second applicant and as a result of which, the two concluded a customary marriage according to Congolese law, which did not make provision for registration of customary marriages. After the first applicant returned to South
Africa (SA) the second applicant joined him using a Congolese passport and a visitor’s visa. At the time of the birth of the child NN in South Africa the second applicant’s visa had expired. For that reason officers in the respondent Department of Home Affairs refused to register the birth of NN on the ground that the Regulations on the Registration of Births and Deaths, 2014 prevented registration of the birth as the child’s mother did not have valid papers to be in SA. The first and second applicants instituted High Court proceedings for orders declaring ss 9 and 10 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992 (BDRA) and some of the 2014 Regulations invalid for being inconsistent with the Constitution.
Bodlani AJ held that ss 9 and 10 of the BDRA were consistent with the Constitution and, therefore, valid. Some of the regulations were found to be inconsistent with the Constitution. To save them the court followed the ‘reading-in’ approach with the result that in their new form they became compliant with the Constitution. Those regulations which could not be saved by the ‘reading-in’ approach were declared unconstitutional and invalid. The first respondent, Director General in the Department of Home Affairs and the second respondent Minister were ordered to pay costs.
The court held that ss 9 and 10 of the BDRA did not forbid unmarried fathers from registering the births of their children in the absence of mothers who gave birth to such children. The requirement was that such children should have been born alive, in which event any one of the parents, regardless of their marital status, would be able to give notice of birth. The ordinary interpretation of the words used in ss 9 and 10 left the statute constitutionally compliant.
Regarding the regulations, the registration of NN’s birth was prohibited as her mother, the second applicant, could not produce a valid visa or permit, it was held that registration of NN’s birth would not be in compliance with those regulations and could not, therefore, proceed. The result of the implementation of the regulations concerned was that they inhibited access to the rights contained in s 28 of the Constitution (children’s rights). For that reason, the regulations were inconsistent with the Constitution and had to be declared invalid.
Family law
Division of assets on termination of permanent life partnership: The facts in the case of Booysen v Stander [2018] 3 All SA 662 (WCC) were that for some 17 years the parties lived together as life partners in a permanent relationship. When the relationship terminated the plaintiff Booysen sought termination of joint ownership of the parties’ immovable property, repayment of a loan made to the defendant Stander and return of a motor vehicle registered in her name, which the defendant had in her possession, basing her claim on the actio communi dividendo. In a counter-claim the defendant sought an order declaring that there was a universal partnership between the parties, the termination of that partnership and equal division of the joint estate.
Andrews AJ held that there was a universal partnership between the parties and terminated their co-ownership of the immovable property concerned. The defendant’s registered share in the property was to be transferred and registered in the plaintiff’s name against payment to the defendant of a specified sum of money. The defendant was allowed to keep the motor vehicle as her sole and exclusive property. Each party was allowed to retain as her sole property the assets and other property in their possession. Furthermore, each party was to pay their own costs.
It was held that the manner in which the parties conducted their affairs was consistent with the concept of universal partnership which described a state of affairs between the parties who met the requirements of a partnership. Consequently, a universal partnership came into existence between the parties. Such a partnership was similar to a marriage in community of property. The relief which parties could claim when married in community of property was either an order for division of a joint estate or an order for forfeiture of the benefits of the marriage. It was trite that each spouse automatically shared in the assets that were accumulated during the subsistence of the marriage. The moment spouses entered into a marriage in community of property, they became co-owners of everything that either of them owned prior to the marriage.
The above fundamental legal principles reinforced the view that the plaintiff’s claim based on the actio communi dividendo could not be sustained as it was near impossible to untangle the threads of interwoven narratives of life partners which had layered complexities akin thereto in the advancement of a joint household. In order to achieve fairness to both parties, the end result had to incorporate a hybrid of both the actio communi dividendo and a universal partnership as there were obvious overlaps in the overarching legal principles, which further extended to the principles analogous to a marriage in community of property. Accordingly, a division of the joint estate had to follow.
Fundamental rights
Access to information – political party funding: In My Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Another 2018 (5) SA 380 (CC); 2018 (8) BCLR 893 (CC), the applicant, My Vote Counts NPC, a non-profit organisation that brought an application in the WCC in which it sought an order declaring the unconstitutionality of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) to the extent that it failed to make provision for political parties to disclose their private funding. That was after the applicant sought such information from political parties, some of whom took cover under the provisions of s 50(1) and ss 63 to 65 of PAIA to avoid disclosing that information. The applicant further sought a declaratory order for the ‘continuous and systematic’ recordal and disclosure of information on private funding for political parties. The High Court granted an order declaring PAIA invalid to the extent of its failure to provide for access to information on private funding of political parties and independent candidates. The declaration of invalidity was suspended for a period of 18 months to allow Parliament an opportunity to remedy the defect. However, the court declined the request for a declaratory order for ‘continuous and systematic’ recordal and disclosure of information on private funding of political parties, holding that doing so would impermissibly encroach on Parliament’s exclusive domain by prescribing to it how to execute its constitutional mandate.
The CC granted an order confirming invalidity of PAIA to the extent that it did not make provision for access to information on the private funding of political parties and independent candidates. The court granted the applicant leave to appeal against the High Court order declining the request for ‘continuous and systematic’ recordal and disclosure of information on private funding of political parties and independent candidates, but the appeal itself was dismissed. Suspension of the period of invalidity was changed to an order directing Parliament to cure the deficiency within a period of 18 months. The minister was ordered to pay costs.
Reading the main judgment Mogoeng CJ held that all information necessary to enlighten the electorate about the capabilities and dependability or otherwise of those seeking public office should not only be compulsorily captured and preserved but should also be made reasonably accessible. Lack of transparency on private funding provided fertile and well-watered ground for corruption or deception of voters. To the extent that PAIA excluded the disclosure of information on the private finding of independent candidates that was required for the exercise or protection of the right to vote or impart information or ideas, it was constitutionally defective. It was an absolute necessity that all, not some, political parties be required to record, preserve and disclose information on their private funding. For that reason, to the extent that PAIA did not cover those political parties that were not juristic persons, it was constitutionally deficient.
In brief, PAIA was deficient because it did not provide that –
On the issue of ‘continuous and systematic’ recordal, preservation and disclosure of private funding of political parties and independent candidates, it was held that it did not fall within the remit of the court to prescribe to Parliament whether the recordal, preservation and disclosure of all the information relating to private funding had to be regulated in terms of PAIA or PAIA and another legislation or PAIA and other measures. That was a decision to be taken by Parliament itself.
On the question of suspension of the declaration of invalidity it was held that the overriding consideration should always be whether the nature of the defect was such that the enjoyment of benefits provided by the invalidated provision would cease to flow if the order of invalidity was not suspended. Absent harm or prejudice to the public or any interest no suspension would be necessary. The order of suspension was not without purpose nor was it an automatic consequence of a declaration of invalidity but was triggered by negative or undesirable consequences that would otherwise flow from a failure to suspend. In the present case there was no purpose that would be served by suspending the declaration of invalidity.
In a separate judgment Froneman J (Cachalia AJ concurring) agreed with the main judgment for slightly different reasons.
Labour law
Placed (temporary) workers earning less than prescribed amount deemed, after three months, to be employees of company they are placed with: Section 198A(3)(b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA), which was introduced by the 2014 Amendments to the LRA, provides among others that an employee who earns less than the stipulated threshold (currently being R 205 000 per year) and is contracted through a temporary employment service (TES – a labour broker) to a client for more than three months is deemed to be employed by that client. The meaning of the section was the issue in Assign Services (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and Others 2018 (5) SA 323 (CC); 2018 (11) BCLR 1309 (CC), where the applicant, Assign Services (a TES), contended that the section created a dual-employment relationship with the result that the employee was employed by both the TES and a client (Krost in the instant case). The respondent trade union, the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA), on the other hand, contended that the section created a sole-employment relationship between the employee and the client. The dispute between the parties was referred to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) by way of a stated case. The CCMA held that the section created a sole-employment relationship. The applicant took the CCMA arbitration award to the LC for review and setting aside, which was done. The LC held that the section created a dual-employment relationship. On appeal to the LAC it was held that the section created a sole-employment relationship. In the present case the applicant applied to the CC for leave to appeal against the order of the LAC. Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal itself was dismissed with costs.
Reading the main judgment Dlodlo AJ held that the purpose of the s 198A amendments was clear. They existed to fill a gap in accountability between client companies and employees who were placed with them. That meant that placed (temporary) employees were fully integrated into the workplace as employees of the client after the three-month period. The contractual relationship between the client and the placed employee did not come into existence through negotiated agreement or through the normal recruitment processes used by the client. The employee automatically became employed on the same terms and conditions of similar employees, with the same employment benefits, the same prospects of internal growth and the same job security that followed. The language used by the legislature in s 198A(3)(b) was plain. When interpreted in context, it supported the sole-employer interpretation and was in line with the purpose of the 2014 Amendments, the primary object of the LRA and the right to favour labour practices in s 23 of the Constitution.
In a dissenting judgment Cachalia AJ held that what s 198A(3)(b) did was to recognise that the TES was ordinarily the employer as stipulated in s 198(2) but that the client was regarded as the employer after the three-month period had elapsed. The deeming provision contained in the section created a statutory employment relationship between the employee and the client in addition to the existing employment relationship between the employee and the TES and not in substitution thereof. Therefore, the dual-employer interpretation was the correct one, while the sole-employer interpretation was clearly wrong.
Local government
Failure to compile supplementary valuation roll renders municipal property rates invalid: Section 49(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 2004 (the MPRA) requires the municipal valuer to submit the certified valuation roll to the municipal manager who must then publish a notice stating that the roll is open for inspection for a period stated in the notice and inviting any person who wishes to lodge an objection to do so in the prescribed manner and within a stated period. A municipality is required to cause a supplementary valuation roll to be prepared in respect of any rateable property, which has come to be included in the municipality after the last general valuation.
In City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Lombardy Development (Pty) Ltd and Others [2018] 3 All SA 605 (SCA) the respondents Lombardy Development and others were property owners situated in the Kungwini Local Municipality where their properties were categorised ‘residential’. However, the municipality was disestablished and absorbed into the appellant City of Tshwane Municipality with effect from July 2011. For a year or more levies were charged on the properties as ‘residential’ but thereafter their category was changed to ‘vacant’ property followed by massive increases in liability for municipal rates. The appellant could not explain how the change came about and the respondents were not given the opportunity to object to new categorisation and rates. No supplementary valuation roll had been prepared as required by s 49(1) of MPRA.
The GP per Tuchten J held that the new municipal rates based on land categorised as ‘vacant’ were invalid and accordingly set them aside. An appeal to the SCA was dismissed with costs.
Ponnan JA (Majiedt, Seriti JJA, Pillay and Makgoka AJJA concurring) held that understood contextually, the High Court order required the appellant to undertake a valid process of re-categorisation of the Kungwini ‘vacant’ properties, thereby complying with MPRA. Put another way, if the appellant wished to apply its ‘vacant’ land rate to those properties it had to first properly re-categorise them as ‘vacant’. That did not require the retrospective compilation of a valuation roll. Rather, it was for the appellant to issue, following the procedures prescribed in the MPRA, a general or supplementary valuation roll that validly re-categorised Kungwini properties as ‘vacant’. Once that was done the appellant would be free to apply the ‘vacant’ land rate to those properties. The respondents did not challenge the validity of rates applicable to ‘vacant’ land and it was plain that the High Court did not mean by its order that the appellant had to reconsider that rate or that the rate had been declared invalid. In other words, in order to validly apply the ‘vacant’ land rate to the affected properties, same had to be validly re-categorised by moving them from the ‘residential’ to the ‘vacant’ category thereby complying with the requirements of the MPRA for effecting a valid re-categorisation.
Other cases
Apart from the cases and material dealt with or referred to above the material under review also contained cases dealing with: Access to information held by a public body, application of ‘no risk’ clause in contracts, cessation of membership of a political party, cost of credit in a consumer credit agreement, elements of offence of corruption, litigation on behalf of a traditional community, marriage out of community of property subject to accrual system, prohibition of doing conveyancing work by non-attorneys, protection of heritage resources, publication of invitation to tender, reinstatement of consumer credit agreement, review of classification of film by Film and Publication Tribunal, service of administrative action proceedings on all affected parties, setting aside arbitration award, validity of regulations governing petroleum exploration and production and whether decision of arbitration tribunal constitutes administrative action.
This article was first published in De Rebus in 2018 (Dec) DR 26.
