David Matlala BProc (University of the North) LLB (Wits) LLM (UCT) LLM (Harvard) HDip Tax Law (Wits) is an adjunct professor of law at the University of Fort Hare.
April 2014 (2) The South African Law Reports (pp 321 – 640); [2014] 1 The All South African Law Reports March no 1 (pp 507 – 625); and no 2 (pp 627 – 698)
Abbreviations:
CAC: Competition Appeal Court
CC: Constitutional Court
ECP: Eastern Cape High Court, Port Elizabeth
GNP: Gauteng North High Court, Pretoria
GSJ/GJ: Gauteng South High Court, Johannesburg (Gauteng Local Division)
SCA: Supreme Court of Appeal
WCC: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
Admiralty jurisdiction
Discretion of the court to order sale of vessel pendente lite: In MV Silver Star: Hilane Ltd v Action Partner Ltd and Others 2014 (2) SA 392 (ECP) the applicant, Hilane, had a maritime claim against the owners of a certain ship in the amount of some US$3,8 million. As a result the applicant caused an associated vessel, Silver Star, to be arrested at a port in Port Elizabeth, after which it instituted proceedings claiming payment. It appeared, however, that in the meantime the vessel was deteriorating in value and thereby adversely affecting the value of the applicant’s security. To preserve that value the applicant applied for an order authorising the sale of the vessel pendente lite. The application that was opposed by the owner of the vessel, the second respondent Action Partner, was dismissed with costs.
Eksteen J held that s 9 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 (the Act) conferred a wide and largely unfettered discretion on the court to order the sale of the vessel at any time in circumstances where such a step was justified. The discretion was to be exercised judicially. Given the breadth of the discretion conferred on the court by the section, it was not possible to list all the factors that would be relevant to its exercise, as a number of considerations would ordinarily emerge. Whereas it was settled law that the sale of a vessel could be ordered pendente lite, the point of departure was that the court would exercise its discretion sparingly unless the owner consented to the sale or was in default of appearance. In the case under review the registered owner of the vessel was vehemently opposed to the sale and would suffer enormous and irrecoverable prejudice from its premature and untimely sale. Moreover, the applicant stood to gain nothing out of the sale as the proceeds would be consumed by a substantial claim of the bank that financed the acquisition of the vessel, which claim was to be followed by that of the time-charterer before that of the applicant could be considered, as it ranked third in the order of preference.
Agriculture
Land Bank is not allowed to finance acquisition of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes: In Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africav Panamo Properties 103 (Pty) Ltd 2014 (2) SA 545 (GJ) the plaintiff, Land Bank, entered into an agreement with the defendant, Panamo, in terms of which it financed the defendant’s acquisition of agricultural land. However, the land in question was not acquired for agricultural purposes. Instead it was acquired for the establishment of a township, namely the development of a residential area. By way of a stated case parties requested the court to make a ruling on whether the transaction was valid, given the provisions of the Land and Agricultural Development Bank Act 15 of 2002 (LADA). A further question was whether a continuous covering bond, registered as security to cover the defendant’s obligation, was affected by the invalidity of the principal transaction, were it to be found to have been invalid.
Claassen J held that the agreement between the Land Bank and the defendant was void ab initio, but that did not mean that the mortgage bond registered to secure payment of the money advanced in terms of the invalid agreement was similarly invalid. The LADA intended the Land Bank to assist previously disadvantaged persons to acquire and develop agricultural land and not the loss of such land in favour of it being developed as a township establishment. The whole purpose of assisting such persons to enter the agricultural industry would be thwarted if the Land Bank was empowered to utilise available farmland for residential development. A distinction had to be made between cases where the obligation, performance of which was secured by a mortgage bond, was invalid, and those in which the obligation itself was not illegal, although it had its origin in, and had been connected with a transaction which was invalid. In the instant case, although the original obligation was invalid, the debt to repay advances made thereunder was not illegal. The mortgage bond, by its very nature, was a separate agreement of hypothecation and its validity was not dependent on the validity of the anterior transaction.
Banking law
Actual or ostensible authority to represent a bank: In the case of Absa Bank Ltd v Arif and Another 2014 (2) SA 466 (SCA) one Mistry was an agent of the appellant Absa Bank, having authority to receive deposits and investments from members of the public. In the course of his duties, Mistry received funds from the respondents – Arif Mohamed and Shiraz Abdul – which were invested. However, theirs were no ordinary investments. The three colluded to open investment accounts in fictitious names, with the intention of making the investments untraceable and thereby defrauding the South African Revenue Service of tax. Moreover, Mistry also acted as the respondents’ financial adviser and bookkeeper. The investment accounts were false and not known to the appellant. Having misappropriated the funds Mistry fled the country. As a result the respondents sought to recover their loss from the appellant. The GSJ held, per Maluleke J, that Mistry had actual and ostensible authority to represent the appellant in making the investments and accordingly found in favour of the respondents. An appeal to the SCA was upheld with costs.
Maya JA (Malan, Petse, Willis and Saldulker JJA concurring) held that the appellant did not give express authority to Mistry to conclude the alleged investment agreements. Moreover, on their own version, the respondents intentionally and knowingly colluded with Mistry to open investment accounts with the appellant in fictitious names to facilitate tax evasion, an unlawful conduct which the appellant was not shown to have authorised Mistry, expressly or otherwise, to undertake on its behalf. The type of agreements which Mistry purportedly concluded with the respondents on the appellant’s behalf did not fall within the category of business or transactions that a branch of a bank and its agent would ordinarily conduct. The respondents could not have believed that engaging in fraudulent conduct fell within Mistry’s functions and that the appellant had authorised him to represent it in unlawful activity. Therefore, the respondents failed to prove that Mistry had implied authority to conclude the alleged investment agreements on the appellant’s behalf. Turning to the question of ostensible authority the court held obiter that a party that knew that a transaction was unlawful or was part of an unlawful scheme, and was aware or should reasonably have been aware that the principal of the agent with whom it was contracting would not countenance the conclusion of such a transaction was, in any event, precluded from relying on ostensible authority.
Autonomy and independence of irrevocable standby letter of credit: Casey and Another v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2014 (2) SA 374 (SCA) is a case in which the first appellant, Casey, caused his bank, Bank of America, to issue an irrevocable standby letter of credit in favour of the respondent FirstRand Bank. The letter was issued as security for the debt which a certain company, Kimberley, owed to the respondent. Kimberley having defaulted on repayment of its debt, the respondent demanded payment from Bank of America and received payment of US$420 000 as demanded in terms of the letter of credit. The first appellant’s account with Bank of America was debited with the amount. Thereafter, the first appellant sought refund from the respondent, alleging that it should not have demanded payment from Bank of America as Kimberley’s debt had prescribed, that the amount demanded and paid included excessive interest in contravention of the in duplum rule and, that as a result, the demand had been fraudulent as the respondent knew of its prescription and that interest charged was not allowed in terms of the in duplum rule. The GSJ per Spilg J dismissed the claim. On appeal to the SCA the appellants achieved partial success. The appeal relating to prescription of the respondent’s claim was dismissed with costs while in respect of the in duplum rule the appeal was upheld with costs.
Swain AJA (Navsa ADP, Tshiqi and Petse JJA concurring and Willis JA dissenting) held that where interest was capitalised and interest was charged on interest, capitalised interest did not lose its character as interest and did not become part of the capital amount for the purposes of the in duplum rule. Therefore, in the instant case interest was not allowed to exceed the initial capital amount of R 980 008. Turning to the question of a letter of credit, the court held that whether the claim of the respondent had prescribed was irrelevant as at the time of demand for payment by the respondent the validity of the letter of credit was beyond dispute. A letter of credit was wholly independent of the underlying contract between the customer of the bank and the beneficiary. It established a contractual obligation on the part of the issuing bank to pay the beneficiary in accordance with its terms. An irrevocable letter of credit was not accessory to the underlying contract and was distinguishable in law from a suretyship contract, which was accessory to the principal obligation. The issuing of the irrevocable letter of credit by Bank of America in favour of the respondent established a contractual obligation on Bank of America to pay the respondent as beneficiary, provided that the conditions specified in the letter were met. Reciprocal obligations in those terms were created between Bank of America and the respondent.
Competition law
Power of the Competition Appeal Court to award costs against the Competition Commission: Section 61(2) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the Act) provides that the CAC may make an order for the payment of costs against any party in a hearing or against any person who represents a party in a hearing, according to the requirements of the law and fairness. In Competition Commission of South Africa v Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc and Others 2014 (2) SA 480 (CC) the two respondent companies, Pioneer and Pannar, which were involved in the hybrid maize seed breeding market, sought to merge. As required by the Act they sought approval of the applicant Competition Commission (the Commission) to effect the merger. The Commission rejected the proposed merger, holding that it was likely to give rise to a substantial prevention or lessening of competition in the hybrid maize seed market. A request to the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) to reconsider the decision of the Commission failed, with the Tribunal citing the same reasons given by the Commission. The Tribunal did not make a costs order, none being sought. The respondents appealed to the CAC against the decision of the Tribunal, in which appeal they asked for costs of the appeal to be paid by the Commission. However, in their heads of argument, the respondents asked for the costs of appeal as well as the costs in the Tribunal proceedings. The CAC upheld the appeal on the merits, allowing the merger to go ahead and ordered the Commission to pay the costs of appeal as well as those in the Tribunal proceedings. No reasons were given for the costs order. Thereafter the Commission sought leave to appeal to the SCA against the entire judgment and costs order, which application was dismissed. It then sought leave of the CAC to appeal to the CC against the costs order only. The respondents did not oppose and merely filed a notice of intention to abide. That leave was granted.
Before the CC the Commission sought leave to appeal and the reversal of the costs order. Both prayers were granted with no order as to costs incurred in the CC. Reading a unanimous judgment of the court Skweyiya ADCJ held that s 61(2) of the Act made it clear that the CAC had the power to award costs. It was, therefore, correct that the section empowered the CAC to make an order of costs against the Commission where the latter was a party before it. That power was, however, qualified by the requirements of the law and fairness. The ordinary course was for costs to follow the result. However, the Commission was not an ordinary civil litigant. The principle that should inform the CAC’s exercise of discretion regarding costs was that when the Commission was litigating in the course of fulfilling its statutory duties, it was undesirable for it to be inhibited in the bona fide fulfilment of its mandate by the threat of an adverse costs award. This flowed from the need to encourage organs of state to make and stand by honest and reasonable decisions, made in the public interest, without the threat of undue financial prejudice if the decision was challenged successfully. The CAC had to be alive to any undue financial prejudice that could result from its order, taking into account the inherently limited means of the Commission as a statutory body acting in the public interest and the nature of the proceedings. Fairness would require the CAC to be sensitive to creating sufficient space for the Commission to be independent in its decision-making, without the threat of an adverse costs order. Unreasonableness, frivolous or vexatious pursuit of a particular stance could, however, justify an order of costs against the Commission, but that would depend on the facts of each case.
The Act prescribed that as a general rule each party in proceedings before the Tribunal should pay its ‘own costs’. The correct interpretation of the ‘own costs’ rule at the Tribunal stage was, therefore, that the Tribunal did not have powers to award costs against the Commission under the Act. Accordingly, it would be contrary to the CAC’s position as an appellate court to interpret s 61(2) of the Act to include a power to award costs in relation to Tribunal proceedings that the Tribunal itself was not empowered to make. Therefore, insofar as the Tribunal was limited in its powers to award costs, the CAC was similarly limited in its powers to award costs in relation to Tribunal proceedings.
Consumer credit agreements
Reinstatement of a consumer credit agreement: Section 129(3)(a) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (the NCA) provides that a consumer may, at any time before the credit provider has cancelled the agreement, reinstate a credit agreement that is in default by paying to the credit provider all amounts that are overdue, together with the credit provider’s permitted default charges and reasonable costs of enforcing the agreement up to the time of reinstatement. Subsection (4) provides, among others, that a consumer may not reinstate a credit agreement after the sale of any property pursuant to an attachment order or the execution of any other court order enforcing that agreement or the determination (cancellation) thereof. In Nkata v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Others 2014 (2) SA 412 (WCC) the respondent FirstRand Bank was granted default judgment by the registrar (not a judge) of the court after breach of two mortgage bond agreements by the applicant, Nkata, fell into arrears with payment. The default judgment order declared the property specially executable. Thereafter the respondent obtained an attachment order and writ of execution and the property was sold to a third-party who in turn on-sold it to a fourth-party, even though it had not yet taken transfer of ownership. After learning of these developments the applicant approached the High Court for an order rescinding the default judgment, setting aside the attachment order and the subsequent sale of the property to the third-party. The parties entered into a settlement agreement in terms of which the applicant would pay costs of the rescission application, which application was not disposed of by the court, this having the result that the default judgment remained intact. Some time later the applicant applied again for another rescission order, the present application, which fell to be dismissed as it was launched some two and half years after the granting of default judgment. Rule 31(2) of the Uniform Rules of Court requires an application for rescission of judgment to be made within 20 days of becoming aware of the default judgment and not after two years, as the applicant did. The applicant had a history of falling into arrears but at least on two occasions she made lump-sum payments bringing the instalments up to date only to fall into arrears again.
Rogers J held that, as the property had already been sold to a third-party who on-sold it to the fourth-party at the time of launching the rescission application some two and half years after the granting of default judgment, there would be prejudice to the third- and fourth-parties if default judgment were to be rescinded. Moreover, having settled the first rescission application with the respondent, the applicant was not allowed to re-open the rescission application as the peremption principle did not allow her to blow ‘hot and cold’ namely, to appropriate and reprobate at the same time. However, the court allowed the applicant to get what she sought albeit through the back door. That was so in that, although her rescission application failed and was dismissed with costs, she nevertheless received what she wanted on the basis of ‘further and/or alternative relief’ as contained in her application. The court held that the mortgage loan agreements were reinstated on two occasions when the applicant made lump-sum payments bringing the agreements up-to-date, which happened after the granting of default judgment. After default judgment became of no force and effect by operation of law due to lump-sum payments, it was no longer permissible to attach the property and sell it in execution. Therefore, both the attachment and sale in execution were invalid and fell to be set aside. Accordingly, the respondent was restrained from causing transfer of the property to be registered in the name of the third party.
On general principles of reinstatement of a consumer credit agreement the court held that the fact that a contractual acceleration clause had become operative did not, for the purposes of s 129(3)(a) of the NCA, obliterate the distinction between the arrear instalments and the full debt. It followed that in order to effect reinstatement in terms of s 129(3)(a), the consumer did not have to pay the full accelerated debt but only the arrear instalments. Furthermore, a credit agreement could only be reinstated if it had not already been cancelled by the credit provider. In order to effect reinstatement the consumer should not only pay all amounts that were overdue, but also the credit provider’s permitted default charges and reasonable costs of enforcing the agreement up to the time of reinstatement. Execution in respect of legal costs should not be levied until the costs have been taxed or the litigant had agreed to their quantification in writing. Even as between an attorney and his own client, the client was entitled to insist on taxation if the attorney sued for payment of his fees and disbursements. In terms of s 129(4) the consumer was not allowed to reinstate a credit agreement after there had been a sale of any property pursuant to an attachment order or after execution of any other court order enforcing that agreement. After all it was not necessary, in order for there to be reinstatement in terms of s 129(3), that the consumer should have been aware of the statutory right of reinstatement and have made payment with the intention of reinstating the agreement. The agreement was reinstated by operation of law if the consumer as a fact made the payment contemplated by s 129(3), unless reinstatement was precluded by virtue of s 129(4).
Divorce
Enforcement of High Court maintenance order by way of writ of execution: Section 26 of the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 (the Maintenance Act) provides that a maintenance order of a High Court is enforceable through the maintenance court, meaning a magistrate’s court. In JM v LM and Another 2014 (2) SA 403 (WCC) the respondent’s wife obtained a pendente lite High Court maintenance order, which the applicant, the husband, failed to comply with. As a result she obtained a writ of execution to enforce payment, resulting in the attachment of the applicant’s movable property. At about the same time, the respondent also obtained an emoluments attachment order in terms of which the employer was ordered to deduct maintenance payment from the applicant’s salary. The applicant launched the present application for an order setting aside the High Court order writ of execution, contending that only the maintenance court, and not the High Court, could enforce a maintenance order. The application was dismissed with costs.
Savage AJ held that as a general rule the court that granted an order retained jurisdiction to ensure that the order was complied with, although that jurisdiction was not exclusive. The fact that a party was permitted to approach the magistrate’s court to enforce a maintenance order of the High Court did not lead to a necessary implication that the High Court was prevented from enforcing its own maintenance order. A litigant could exercise an election in seeking interim relief pendente lite in a matrimonial matter either from the High Court or from the applicable magistrate’s court. The Maintenance Act and the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 were capable of standing together. The legislature, while seeking to advance effectiveness and accessibility in the maintenance system through the Maintenance Act, did not intend to limit the right of the High Court to enforce orders granted by it.
Engineering and construction law
Independence of ‘construction guarantee’ from underlying contract: In Coface South Africa Insurance Co Ltd v East London Own Haven t/a Own Haven Housing Association 2014 (2) SA 382 (SCA), [2014] 1 All SA 536 (SCA) the respondent, East London Own Haven, entered into two contracts, the principal contract being a construction contract with one C in terms of which the latter agreed to construct a building for the respondent. As was customary the respondent entered into a second contract, a construction guarantee contract, with the appellant Coface in terms of which the appellant guaranteed that it would pay if the respondent cancelled the principal contract due to the contractor’s default. Thereafter the appellant refused to pay in terms of the construction guarantee, contending that in terms of the principal contract the respondent, and not the contractor, being at fault was not entitled to cancel the contract. The respondent took exception to the appellant’s defence, which exception was upheld by the GSJ per Satchwell J. Armed with the exception, the appellant sought to amend its plea so as to rely on the dispute relating to the principal contract as a defence to its liability under the construction guarantee. In the application to amend the parties agreed that if the amendment was rejected the respondent would be entitled to judgment in terms of the construction guarantee. Lamont J dismissed the amendment application, hence the instant appeal to the SCA. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Navsa ADP and Pillay JA (Maya, Malan JJA and Swain AJA concurring), relying on English and South African decisions, held that construction or performance guarantees, being the equivalent of performance bonds in English law, were virtually promissory notes payable on demand. A performance guarantee stood on a similar footing to a letter of credit. A bank that gave a performance guarantee had to honour it according to its terms. It was not concerned with the relations between the parties to the principal contract, nor with the question whether a party to the principal contract had performed its contractual obligation or not, nor with the question whether or not one of the parties was in default. The guarantor (appellant) had to pay according to its guarantee, on demand if so stipulated, without proof or conditions. The only exception was when there was a clear fraud of which the guarantor had notice. Performance guarantees had to be met according to their terms and disputes concerning the principal agreement could be dealt with later.
Government procurement
Disqualification of tender bid for failure to provide original tax clearance certificate: In Dr JS Moroka Municipality and Others v Betram (Pty) Ltd and Another [2014] 1 All SA 545 (SCA) the appellant municipality, Dr JS Moroka Municipality, being the Siyabuswa Municipality in Mpumalanga, invited tenders for the supply of toilets. One of the documents required to accompany the bid papers was ‘a valid original tax clearance certificate’. Far from providing the original, the respondent Betram furnished a copy of the tax clearance certificate, for which reason the municipality’s bid evaluation committee rejected the bid. The GNP declared the rejection of the first respondent’s bid and award of the tender to the second respondent, Eldocrete, invalid and unlawful and granted ancillary relief. An appeal to the SCA against the decision was upheld with costs.
Leach JA (Brand, Maya, Bosielo and Wallis JJA concurring) held that it was for the municipality, and not the court, to decide what a prerequisite for a valid tender should be. A failure to comply with prescribed conditions would result in a tender being disqualified as an acceptable tender under the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 unless those conditions were immaterial, unreasonable or unconstitutional. The requirement that tenders should be awarded only to persons whose tax affairs had been declared by the South African Revenue Service to be in order echoed loudly throughout various statutes and regulations. There was no hint on the papers in the instant case that such requirement was in any way unconstitutional, unreasonable, irrelevant or immaterial. Nor was it suggested that it was unreasonable, irrelevant or immaterial for the appellant to have required an original, rather than a copy, of a tax clearance certificate.
Mining and minerals
Polluter pays principle: Section 19(1) of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 (NWA) provides, among others, that an owner of land, a person in control of land or a person who occupies or uses land on which any activity or process is or was performed or undertaken or any other situation exists, which causes or has caused or is likely to cause pollution of a water resource, must take reasonable measures to prevent any such pollution from occurring, continuing or recurring. Part 4 of chap 3 of the NWA, of which s 19 is the only section, provides specifically that the person who owns, controls, occupies or uses the land in question (the landholder) is responsible for taking reasonable measures to prevent pollution of water resources. In Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd v Regional Director: Free State Department of Water Affairs and Others [2014] 1 All SA 553 (SCA) the issue was whether a person who once owned, controlled, occupied or used land, but had since ceased doing so, was responsible for taking measures to prevent pollution of water resources. There the appellant, Harmony, contended that as it had ceased being the landholder, after selling the mining business and thereafter transferring the land to a third party, it was no longer under an obligation to prevent pollution of water resources. The GNP per Makgoka J dismissed the appellant’s application for an order declaring that directives issued by the first respondent, the Regional Director, to the effect that it should prevent pollution of water resources, were invalid or should be suspended as it had ceased being the landholder. An appeal to the SCA was dismissed with no order as to costs as the case raised a genuine constitutional issue.
Meyer AJA (Navsa ADP, Brand, Shongwe JJA and Zondi AJA concurring) held that the duty to take all reasonable measures to prevent pollution from occurring, continuing or recurring was imposed on the person who owned, controlled, occupied or used the land. Section 19(3) of NWA made it plain that the legislature intended to vest the Minister with wide discretionary powers and to leave it to him or her to determine what measures a defaulting landholder had to take and for how long it should continue to do so. There was nothing in the wording of subs (3) or in the other provisions of s 19, which warranted the conclusion that the Minister’s powers under subs (3) were intended to be limited in that he or she could order the landholder to take anti-pollution measures for as long as it remained the landholder. The rationale of subs (3) was to direct the landholder to address the pollution or risk of pollution, however long it would take to do so. The rationale did not fall away when the landholder ceased to own, control, occupy or use the land. If that was not so the landholder could easily evade its obligations by simply severing ties with the land. It could, for example, simply transfer the land to a bankrupt subsidiary. The appellant’s restrictive interpretation of subs (3) would result in the absurdity that a polluter would walk away from pollution caused by it with impunity, irrespective of the principle that it should pay the costs of preventing, controlling or minimising and remedying the pollution.
Unlawful occupation of land
Just and equitable eviction: Section 4(7) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) provides, among others, that if an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in question for more than six months at the time when the proceedings are initiated, a court may grant an order for eviction if it is of the opinion that it is ‘just and equitable’ to do so after considering all the relevant circumstances. Relevant circumstances include, among others, the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and households headed by women. In Resnick v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2014 (2) SA 337 (WCC) the appellant, Resnick, was a single mother with two children, 20 and 16-years-old. After initially unlawfully occupying land belonging to the respondent, the government, she was subsequently granted lease. However, the lease was cancelled when she failed to pay rental. A magistrate’s court granted the respondent an eviction order, hence her appeal to the High Court.
Davis J (Fortuin J concurring) dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs, given the appellant’s difficult financial position. The court held that a ‘just and equitable’ order meant ensuring that the appellant was to be given significant time to find alternative accommodation. However, the ‘just and equitable’ jurisprudence could not stretch far enough to overturn the eviction order of the court a quo. That significant time, in the instant case, meant eviction of the appellant after six months of granting the order. Were the court to take the view that a ‘just and equitable’ order trumped illegality so that a person in the circumstances of the appellant could remain indefinitely on the property, no matter the illegality of the occupation, that would create vast and significant implications for eviction procedures throughout the province, given that the decision was that of the full Bench.
Other cases
Apart from the cases and material dealt with or referred to above the material under review also contained cases dealing with acquisitive prescription, adjudication of public transport system disputes, amendment of patent during revocation proceedings, anti-dissipation interdict pendente lite, defences of public interest and truth in defamation claims, duties of bank and client regarding payment instruction, effect of application for rescission of judgment, failure to convert old order mining rights, failure to notify debtor of cession, interpretation of contract, invalidity of appointment of Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, legality of administrative action, pension funds adjudication, reinstatement of registration of a company, right to legal representation at a Centre for Concialiation, Mediation and Arbitration hearing, separation of issues in divorce proceedings, statutory requirements for disposal of public assets, trade mark infringement, unfair dismissal and winding-up of companies.
This article was first published in De Rebus in 2014 (June) DR 33.
