The law reports – October 2013

October 1st, 2013

David Matlala BProc (University of the North) LLB (Wits) LLM (UCT) LLM (Harvard) HDip Tax Law (Wits) is an adjunct professor of law at the University of Fort Hare.

August 2013 (4) The South African Law Reports (pp 319 – 639); [2013] 3 The All South African Law Reports July no 1 (pp 1 – 110) and no 2 (pp 111 – 225)


CC: Constitutional Court

ECP: Eastern Cape High Court, Port Elizabeth

GNP: North Gauteng High Court

GSJ: South Gauteng High Court

SCA: Supreme Court of Appeal

WCC: Western Cape High Court


Caregiver with duty to support a child may be appointed its foster-parent: Section 156(1) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (the Act) provides, among others, that if a child has no parent or caregiver or has a parent or caregiver but that person is unable or unsuitable to care for the child, such a child may be placed in foster care with a suitable foster-parent.

In NM v Presiding Officer of Children’s Court, Krugersdorp and Others 2013 (4) SA 379 (GSJ) the appellant, Ms Manana, was the maternal grandmother and caregiver of three minor children whose mother, her daughter, had died. As the children’s biological father was unknown, they were orphans.

The appellant was the recipient of a monthly disability grant of R 1 010, as well as a child support grant of R 750 for the three children (R 250 per child) and a R 710 foster grant for another grandchild, totalling an income of R 2 470 per month. However, her total monthly expenses were R 2 850, leaving her with a shortfall.

When she applied to the children’s court to be appointed as the three children’s foster-parent and receive a foster grant, the commissioner (the first respondent) rejected the application on the basis that she was already taking care of the children and, as a result, they were not in need of care and protection

On appeal, the High Court reversed the decision of the commissioner, holding that the children were in need of care and protection. She was appointed their foster-parent and they were declared to be entitled to a foster care grant.

Carelse J (Mathopo J concurring) held that it was trite law that grandparents, like parents, had a common-law duty of support towards their grandchildren, which position was consistent with the Constitution.

However, s 156(1) of the Act specifically provided for caregivers to become foster-parents, whether or not they owed the children a duty of support. In this matter, having regard to the fact that the children were orphans, that the appellant had applied for them to be placed in her foster care and that they had been living with her for some time and, further, that their father was unknown, it was in the children’s best interest that the court should find them to be in need of care and protection. However, since the appellant did not have the financial means to support the children, the court ordered that a foster grant must be paid to her. The appeal was upheld and the decision of the children’s court was set aside.


Abuse of business rescue process: In Absa Bank Limited v Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd and Another Related Matter [2013] 3 All SA 146 (GSJ) two conflicting applications were heard together. The first one was by the applicant, Absa Bank, for the winding-up of the respondent, Newcity. The second was lodged by the sole shareholder and only director of Newcity for it to be placed under supervision and commencement of business rescue proceedings in terms of the provisions of s 131(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act).

The question before the court was whether it should grant a winding-up or a business rescue proceedings order. The court granted neither of them. The provisional winding-up order that had been granted was discharged, the court granting an order in terms of which the company had to make certain payments to the applicant bank according to a programme that would result in a full settlement of the company’s indebtedness to the bank, failure of which the bank could apply for its winding-up.

On the issue of business rescue proceedings, Sutherland J held that there was considerable evidence from which to draw an inference that such proceedings were not genuine. The frank admission by the company’s sole shareholder and director, Mr Cohen, that his first rescue application, which he had withdrawn, was a ruse and that the second application, launched a day before the hearing of a final winding-up application, would be withdrawn if the provisional winding-up order was discharged, was sufficient to establish the feigned character of the invocation of the device of business rescue.

Moreover, various incidents of non-disclosure of transactions in terms of which company property was sold, as well as diversion of the company’s revenue stream, also not candidly revealed, were damaging to the efforts being seen as bona fide. As the object of the planned business rescue was to paralyse the liquidation application, it could properly be inferred that its sole purpose was to block liquidation proceedings and that it had no objective beyond that outcome. Therefore, the business rescue application had to be branded an abuse and refused.

The court reiterated the following general principles applicable to business rescue applications, namely:

  • The threshold standard for deciding that a business rescue order is appropriate is whether there is a ‘reasonable prospect or reasonable possibility’ of achieving a rescue through the statutory objectives stated in s 128(1)(b) of the Act. In this regard the point of departure is that it is preferable to rescue a company than to let it drift, or sometimes plummet, into extinction.
  • Close scrutiny of the factual platform presented and the rationale mounted on that platform are required in order to decide if the threshold standard has been met. The assessment has to be made on solid information presented to the court, not on conjecture.
  • The risk of abuse or manipulation of the rescue application process through ‘un-genuine’ applications to procure an illegitimate immunity must be guarded against.


‘Reasonable prospect’ of business rescue is required: In Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 (SCA) a creditor – the second respondent, Nedbank, which also held shares in the company concerned, namely the first respondent Farm Bothasfontein – obtained summary judgment against the latter and sought to have a sale in execution. To avoid the sale, another creditor of the company – the first appellant Oakdene, together with a shareholder, the second appellant Educated Risk – applied for an order placing the company under supervision and commencing business rescue proceedings in terms of the provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act).

As it was common cause that the company would not be able to continue on a solvent basis, the purpose of the business rescue proceedings was to enable the shareholders and creditors to get a better return than would be the case if a sale in execution proceeded. The business rescue proceedings were opposed by the first and second respondents.

Thereafter, Nedbank changed its stance from a sale in execution to a liquidation application, which was opposed on the ground that liquidation would be more expensive and render less return as, in business rescue proceedings, the practitioner would raise more funds in selling the property of the company than a liquidator if the company were to be wound up. In the GSJ Claassen J refused the business rescue application and granted a liquidation order. An appeal to the SCA against the order was dismissed with costs.

Brand JA (Cachalia JA, Van der Merwe, Zondi and Meyer AJJA concurring) held that, according to s 128(1)(h) of the Act, ‘rescuing the company’ meant ‘achieving the goals set out in the definition of business rescue.’ The potential business rescue plan that s 128(1) contemplated had two goals, namely a primary goal, which was to facilitate the continued existence of the company in a state of solvency and, a secondary goal, which was provided in the alternative in the event that the achievement of the primary goal proved not to be viable, namely to facilitate a better return for the creditors or shareholders of the company than would result from immediate liquidation.

It followed that the achievement of any one of the two goals referred to in s 128(1) would qualify as ‘business rescue’. The ‘reasonable prospect’ test for achieving any of the required goals was generally accepted to be a lesser requirement than the ‘reasonable probability’, which was the yardstick for placing a company under judicial management in terms of s 427(1) of the  Companies Act 61 of 1973. However, ‘reasonable prospect’ required more than a mere prima facie case or an arguable possibility. ‘Reasonable prospect’ should be based on reasonable grounds. A mere speculative suggestion would not be enough.

In this matter the appellants’ business rescue proposal consisted of no more than an alternative winding-up and could therefore not be sustained. Moreover, it was intended to avoid the investigative powers of the liquidator to look into transactions and circumstances under which the company had been stripped of all its income and virtually all its assets under the management of its director.

Customary marriages

Consent of first wife is required to conclude a subsequent customary marriage: In MM v MN and Another 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC) the appellant, Ms M, was married to a Mr Moyana in terms of Xitsonga customary law. After the death of her husband in 2009 she sought to register her marriage in terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (the Recognition Act). The problem was, however, that another woman, the first respondent Ms N, also sought to register her marriage with Moyana, alleging that they were married in 2008, while the marriage between M and Moyana took place in 1984. Each woman disputed the validity of the other’s marriage.

As a result M sought a High Court order declaring her marriage valid and that of N null and void as she, as the first wife, had not consented to it. The GNP granted M both orders. However, in an appeal to the SCA, the court upheld the validity of both marriages. As a result M made a further appeal to the CC for an order upholding the validity of her marriage and another declaring the marriage of N null and void. The orders sought were granted with no order as to costs.

The main judgment was delivered by Froneman, Kham­pepe and Skweyiya JJ (Moseneke DCJ, Cameron and Yacoob JJ concurring), while Zondo J and Jafta J (Mogoeng CJ and Nkabinde J concurring) delivered dissenting judgments. The court held that Xitsonga customary law had to be developed to require the consent of the first wife to a customary marriage for the validity of a subsequent customary marriage entered into by her husband

The finding that the consent of the first wife was a necessary dignity-and-equality component of a further customary marriage in terms of s 3(1) of the Recognition Act meant that, from the date of judgment and its publication and distribution by the House of Traditional Leaders and the Minister for Home Affairs in a way that they deemed appropriate, further customary marriages had to comply with that consent requirement. Therefore, a subsequent customary marriage would be invalid if consent from the first wife was not obtained.

The court emphasised that its order operated prospectively to customary marriages entered into after delivery of the judgment and its publication as indicated above so as to avoid inequitable consequences for women who entered into a subsequent customary marriage without knowledge that the consent of the first wife was a requirement for the validity of that subsequent marriage.

The first wife’s rights to equality and human dignity were not compatible with allowing her husband to marry another woman without her consent. The potential for infringement of the dignity and equality rights of wives in polygymous marriages was undoubtedly present. While the court had to accord customary law the respect it deserved, it could not shy away from its obligation to ensure that it developed in accordance with the normative framework of the Constitution. Any notion of the first wife’s equality with her husband would be completely undermined if he were able to introduce a new marriage partner to their domestic life without her consent.


No further division of joint estate after finalisation of divorce and division of estate: Section 7(7) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 (the Act) provides, among others, that in the determination of patrimonial benefits to which the parties to any divorce action may be entitled, the pension interest of a party shall be deemed to be part of his assets.

In Fritz v Fundsatwork Umbrella Pension Fund and Others 2013 (4) SA 492 (ECP) the parties were married in community of property. When the marriage was dissolved by a decree of divorce the parties entered into a settlement agreement relating to division of the joint estate that dealt with movable and immovable assets but was silent on pension benefits.

After the death of the husband some years later, the wife applied for a declaratory order in terms of which she would be entitled to half of the pension interest of the deceased in the first respondent fund, namely Fundsatwork. As it turned out, at the time of divorce the deceased was not a member of the first respondent although, when he joined it later, a transfer of pension benefits from some pension fund took place. The details of such fund and the amount transferred were not forthcoming.

Goosen J dismissed the application with costs, holding that once a joint estate had, as a matter of fact, been divided, whether by agreement or otherwise, a court could not thereafter grant an order in terms of s 7(7) of the Act. Where there was no longer a joint estate to be divided an order the effect of which was to ‘deem’ a pension interest to be part of the joint estate was not competent.

The court added obiter that it did not have to consider what the effect would be of a challenge to the terms of an agreement regarding the manner of division of a joint estate on the basis of an alleged fraud or some other cognisable legal basis for avoiding such agreement, since that was not the issue in the instant case. Nor did the court have to consider whether division of a joint estate could be revisited on the basis of the failure, for whatever reason, to include certain assets in the division that ought to have been included.

In any action or application brought on such basis the erstwhile spouse and party to the division of the joint estate would of necessity have to be joined as a necessary party. Where that party was deceased, the executor would be a necessary party. Failure to join such necessary party would be an insuperable obstacle to the grant of the relief sought.


Redistribution order not competent where marriage is already dissolved: Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 provides, among others, that a court granting a decree of divorce in respect of a marriage out of community of property may, on application by one of the parties to the marriage and in the absence of any agreement between them regarding the division of their assets, order that such assets, or such part of the assets, of the other party as the court may deem just, be transferred to the first-mentioned party. For present purposes this section should be read together with r 15(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court, which provides that no proceedings shall terminate solely by reason of the death, marriage or other change of status of any party unless the cause of such proceedings is thereby extinguished.

In YG v Executor, Estate Late CGM 2013 (4) SA 387 (WCC) the parties were married out of community of property. Some years later the plaintiff (the wife) instituted divorce proceedings in which she sought a decree of divorce, redistribution of property in terms of s 7(3) of the Divorce Act and personal maintenance.

After litis contestatio was reached, but before the hearing of the matter, the husband died whereupon the plaintiff amended her papers to proceed with the claim for distribution of the assets only; the death of the husband having dissolved the marriage. The question before the court was whether her redistribution claim had been extinguished by the death of the husband.

Gangen AJ held that the claim for distribution had been extinguished by the death of the husband and dismissed the action with costs. The court held that it was not competent for a party to a divorce action to pursue a claim for ancillary relief where the marriage was already dissolved, irrespective of whether litis contestatio had taken place. Only a court granting a divorce order could grant ancillary relief such as the redistribution of assets.

Moreover, divorce was a personal action that came to an end automatically when one of the spouses died before a divorce order was granted. Similarly, a claim for redistribution was a personal right between the parties that only a court granting an order of divorce had a discretion to entertain having regard to other ancillary relief to be granted in terms of s 7 of the Act.

Labour law

Automatically unfair dismissal based on gender, religion and culture: Section 187(1)(f) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA) provides, among others, that the dismissal of an employee shall be automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including but not limited to race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, religion, conscience, belief, political opinion or culture.

In Department of Correctional Services and Another v Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (Popcru) and Others [2013] 3 All SA 1 (SCA) the respondents, employees of the appellant, the Department of Correctional Services, and members of the first appellant trade union, Popcru, were dismissed from their employment for keeping and refusing to shave their dreadlocks. It was the contention of some of them that their hairstyle was kept as part of their Rastafarian religion. In the case of others, it was contended that it was part of their culture, and the Xhosa culture in particular, and that the dreadlocks would eventually be shaved, but only after observance of certain rituals.

The employer contended that the dreadlocks had to be shaved to ensure uniformity of appearance, neatness, discipline and also to reduce a security risk as they could easily be grabbed by a prison inmate in order to disarm an employee.

The Labour Court, per Cele J, held that the dismissal of the employees was automatically unfair and ordered reinstatement for those who wanted it and compensation for those who were not prepared to go back to work. It was held that there had been gender discrimination as insistence on shaving dreadlocks was confined to male employees, while their female colleagues were allowed to wear the dreadlocks.

An appeal to the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) was dismissed. Murphy AJA (Waglay DJP and Davis JA concurring) held that the employer had discriminated against the employees on the basis of gender, culture and religion. A further appeal to the SCA was dismissed with costs.

Maya JA (Nugent, Pillay JJA, Mbha and Plasket AJJA concurring) held that, but for their religious and cultural beliefs, the employees would not have worn dreadlocks and, but for that fact and their male gender, they would not have been dismissed.

A policy that effectively punished the practice of a religion and culture degraded and devalued the followers of that religion and culture in society. It was a palpable invasion of their dignity, which implied that their religion or culture was not worthy of protection.

Moreover, no evidence had been led to prove that the employees’ hair, worn that way for many years before they were ordered to shave it, detracted in any way from the performance of their duties or rendered them vulnerable to manipulation or corruption. Therefore, it was not established that short hair, not worn in dreadlocks, was an inherent requirement of their jobs.

A policy was not justified if it restricted the practice of a religious belief – and by necessary extension, a cultural belief – that did not affect an employee’s ability to perform his or her duties nor jeopardised the safety of the public or other employees or caused undue hardship to the employer in a practical sense.

No rational connection had been established between the purported purpose of the discrimination and the measure taken. Neither had it been established that the employer would suffer an unreasonable burden if it exempted the employees concerned.

Local government

Unwarranted withholding  of municipal clearance certificate: In order to assist municipalities in the collection of money due to them in respect of municipal services, property rates and taxes, the Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (the Systems Act) uses two methods. First, in terms of s 118(1), the registrar of deeds may not register the transfer of the property unless the municipality concerned certifies that all debts have been settled in respect thereof for two years preceding the date of application for the certificate.

Secondly, in terms of s 118(3), a municipality has security for payment of the debt in that it is given a ‘charge’ (security) on the property in connection with which the amount is owing and enjoys preference over any mortgage bond registered against the property. The effect of these provisions is that, in respect of the two-year period debt preceding the registration of the transfer request, the municipality has a right to decline issuing a clearance certificate; whereas for any period before that (the historical debt) the municipality has a preference claim against the mortgagee bank, but is not empowered to withhold a clearance certificate.

In City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Ma­tha­bathe and Another 2013 (4) SA 319 (SCA) the appellant, the City of Tshwane, withheld a clearance certificate not only for non-payment of a debt covered by the s 118(1) two-year period but also for a prior period and, in respect of the latter historical debt period, it demanded that the transferring attorney should provide an undertaking that payment would be made at the time of registration or within 48 hours thereafter.

The respondents – Matha­ba­­the, and the mortgagee bank, Nedbank – obtained a GNP order in which Goodey AJ held that the respondent was not allowed to demand the undertaking. The SCA dismissed the appeal against the High Court order with costs.

Ponnan JA (Majiedt JA, Eras­mus, Swain and Zondi AJJA concurring) held that municipalities were obliged to collect money that became payable to them for property rates and taxes and for the provision of municipal services. They were assisted to fulfil that obligation in two ways: First, they were given security for repayment of the debt in that it was given a charge on the property concerned (s 118(3)); and, secondly, they were in certain circumstances given the capacity to block the transfer of ownership of the property until debts had been paid (s 118(1)).

The principal elements of s 118 were accordingly a veto or embargo provision (s 118(1)) and a security provision without a time limit (s 118(3)). Section 118(3) was an independent, self-contained provision providing security amounting to a lien having the effect of a tacit statutory hypothec with no time limit placed on its duration outside of insolvency. Its effect was to create, in favour of a municipality, security for payment of the prescribed debts so that a municipality enjoyed preference over a registered mortgage bond on the proceeds of the property.

Unlike s 118(1), s 118(3) was not an embargo provision but a security provision. In the instant case the appellant municipality failed to draw that distinction and thus confused the two distinct remedies available to it. Having misconstrued the section, the appellant sought, in addition to the security that it enjoyed for the historical debt to which no limit in duration existed, the postulated understanding that payment be made within 48 hours. In that it had to fail.

Prevention of organised crime

Restraint order in respect of ‘realisable property’ and ‘affected gift’: Section 12 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (POCA) defines an ‘affected gift’ as, among others, any gift made by the defendant concerned not more than seven years before the fixed date, or made at any time if it was a gift of property by that defendant in connection with an offence committed by him or her or any other person. Such a gift also includes property or any part thereof that directly or indirectly represented in that defendant’s hands property received by him or her in that connection.

‘Realisable property’ is defined in s 14 to mean any property held by the defendant concerned and any property held by a person to whom that defendant has directly or indirectly made any affected gift.

In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Cunningham and Others [2013] All SA 97 (WCC) a provisional restraint order having been granted against the first respondent Cunningham (C), the issue was whether two mortgage bonds registered by him in favour of the first respondent, one D, as well as cash payment made in favour of D, were ‘affected gifts’ and ‘realisable property’. D contended that they were not as the transactions resulted from a settlement agreement that had been made an order of court.

The settlement agreement was the result of a delictual claim that D instituted against C, the latter having committed fraud against Fidentia (F) when selling shares and a loan account to F, which sale was based on falsified financial statements and inflated the value of the shares. Thereafter C committed another fraud, this time against D and other minority shareholders by misleading them as to the total value of the shares in the company, Webworks, which he misrepresented as being R 35 million instead of the R 160 million for which the shares had been sold to F. On discovery of the price paid by F to C, D and the other minority shareholders demanded a bigger share of the R 160 million.

In terms of the agreement, the claim of D and the others was settled in the amount of R 16 million, R 13 million of which was secured by two mortgage bonds registered over C’s properties, while the remaining R 3 million was paid in cash of over R 1 million and the balance in monthly instalments. C’s mortgaged properties were in fact also proceeds of crime. On the return day of the provisional restraint order the issue was whether the two mortgage bonds and cash payment were ‘realisable property’ and ‘affected gifts’ so as to make it possible for a final restraint order to be granted over them.

Henny J held that that was indeed the case and granted a final restraint order. The court held that, although as between C, D and other respondents, the settlement agreement, which had been made an order of court, was res iudicata, that did not mean that any realisable property that had been transferred as a result of such agreement and formed part of the proceeds of crime within the meaning of POCA was insulated from a restraint order.

The settlement agreement was between C, D and the other respondents. It did not bind a third party like the authorities and could not exclude the operation of POCA and the ability of the authorities to restrain or gain control of the realisable property if such property were either the proceeds of crime or the realisable property of C.

The property transferred in terms of the settlement agreement was the realisable property of C. Whether D or any recipient of such property or payment received it innocently was, for the purposes of POCA, not relevant. What was relevant was whether the recipient was entitled to it. Where it was shown that such property was the proceeds of crime, the transfer thereof to an innocent party could not protect it from the effect or consequences of that crime. If it was the realisable property of C, D was in terms of s 14 of POCA not entitled to it as it was an ‘affected gift’.

Having regard to the wide reach and purpose of POCA, any transfer of realisable property of the defendant to any person who would also not be entitled to such property, whether willing or not, such property would be regarded as a ‘gift’. Accordingly, there was transfer of property by C to D when the mortgage bonds were registered in favour of D as security for payment in terms of the settlement agreement as well as when cash payment was made, which property was a ‘realisable property’ and ‘affected gift’.

State tenders

Inconsequential irregularities do not invalidate public contracts: The issue in AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency and Others 2013 (4) SA 557 (SCA) was the validity of a tender contract awarded by a public entity, the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), being an entity in charge of payment of social grants in the country, after having invited tenders for payment of social grants.

A very important aspect of the provision of such service was indicated in the tender documents as biometric verification such as by way of fingerprint or voice identification of the beneficiary of a grant at pay point, which verification was intended to counter fraud and theft of grants as well as payment to beneficiaries who had died, this being an aspect of fraud.

Apart from assessment of tenders on written presentation it was indicated that bidders could be invited to oral presentation for clarification of their proposals. The documents required a bidder to achieve a minimum of score of 70%. After assessment of the tenders the first appellant, AllPay, secured a score of 70,42% overall while its competitor, CPS, scored 79,79%, which scores were provisional results. The other bidders were eliminated. Both AllPay and CPS were invited to oral presentation, albeit at a somewhat short notice of one day in the case of AllPay and a few hours in the case of CPS. Thereafter the final score was given and showed that AllPay did not do well as it achieved 58%, while CPS improved to 82,44%. The reason was obvious: AllPay was not able to provide biometric verification at pay points and could only do so once a year, while CPS was able to do the required verification and was accordingly awarded the contract.

The GNP held, per Matojane J, that the tender process was illegal and invalid but declined to set aside the award of the tender to CPS. AllPay appealed against that decision, while CPS cross-appealed against the illegality and invalidity decision of the High Court. The SCA dismissed the appeal and upheld the cross-appeal, both with costs.

Nugent JA (Ponnan, Theron, Petse JJA and Southwood AJA concurring) held that there would be few cases in which flaws in the process of public procurement (state tenders) could not be found, particularly where the process was scrutinised intensely with the objective of doing so.

However, a fair process did not demand perfection and not every flaw was fatal. It would be gravely prejudicial to the public interest if the law were to invalidate public contracts for inconsequential irregularities. An act was not irregular for the purposes of law simply because one chose to call it that. An irregularity that led to invalidity was one that was in conflict with the law. If it was in conflict with the law it would not be able to produce a legally valid result.

Other cases

Apart from the cases and material dealt with or referred to above, the material under review also contained cases dealing with appointment of a legal representative for a minor child in divorce proceedings; collective agreement in labour law; concurrent jurisdiction of the High Court and the Labour Court; contempt of magistrates’ court order to be enforced by magistrates’ court; conversion of winding-up proceedings into business rescue proceedings; deferment of implementation of sections of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008; dispute of fact; failure to convert old order mining right into new order mining right; guarantee and counter-guarantee contract; holding over on termination of lease; huur gaat voor koop rule; irrevocable standby letter of credit; liquidation and distribution account for company in winding-up; non-joinder of necessary party to proceedings; notice to consumer in terms of s 129 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005; proceedings by liquidator for company in winding-up; prohibition of financial assistance in connection with acquisition of shares; reinstatement of registration of a company or close corporation; relief from oppressive or unfairly prejudicial act or omission; remedies for infringement of patent right; requirements for final sequestration; right of shareholder to enforce articles of association; stay of application for striking off of attorney from the roll; town-planning and zoning scheme; unconstitutionality of entry, search and inspection in terms of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 and zero-rated supplies in terms of the Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991.

This article was first published in De Rebus in 2013 (Oct) DR 53.