Rademeyer v Ferreira 2025 (1) BCLR 73 (CC)In Rademeyer, the legal issue on prescription involved whether a claim was extinguished by prescription, based on the expiration of the time limit for bringing a particular claim, subsequent to an initial claim being granted. The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) and Constitutional Court (CC) reached different conclusions, which are compared below.
The central issue was whether the respondent’s claim against the applicant was barred by prescription, which means whether the time allowed for initiating the legal claim had passed. Should prescription have run, it would extinguish the claim. Prescription periods are set by law, in particular the Prescription Act 68 of 1969, and vary depending on the nature of the claim.
In this particular case, the respondent argued that his claim was not prescribed because he had acted in a manner that prevented the start of the prescription period from running.
The SCA held that the initial application for specific performance, with an alternative for damages, did interrupt the prescription period. Due to this interruption, the respondent could, therefore, pursue a subsequent damages claim on the applicant’s non-performance without the time for bringing a claim having lapsed since, according to the SCA, the former and latter claim arose from the same underlying breach of contract (ie, the same cause of action).
The CC on the other hand applied a strict interpretation, ruling that prescription had in fact started to run from the date of breach of contract. The court underlined that the remedies of specific performance, cancellation and damages are mutually exclusive. It held that because the respondent initially instituted proceedings for specific performance, the claim for cancellation and damages could only arise after the applicant failed to abide by the court judgment to perform. Consequently, the claim for damages arises from a distinct cause of action and the bringing of the initial claim could not serve to interrupt prescription for the latter.
The minority judgment had a more holistic approach to the question of prescription and its interruption, highlighting the need to interpret prescription laws in a manner that allows for access to justice.
Ultimately, the SCA found that the claim for specific performance and the claim for damages stemmed from the same cause of action, which permitted for an interruption of the prescription period and a subsequent claim for damages to be brought. In contrast, the CC argued that the damages claim only flowed after the non-compliance of the respondent with the judgment for specific performance being granted and that the initial application for specific performance could, therefore, not serve to interrupt the prescription period for bringing an additional claim for damages.
This case underscores the importance of carefully considering the timing and nature of legal claims, as well as the strategic implications of electing one remedy over another in contract disputes.
Celine Bakker BA (Law) LLB (Stell) is a legal practitioner at SL Law in Cape Town.
This article was first published in De Rebus in 2025 (April) DR 32.
